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I
Where Are the Doctrinal Issues?
One of the finest and, from the religious
point of view, one of the most appropriate
of the many statues in our National Capitol
is the equestrian figure of Bishop Francis
Asbury. In his speech of dedication, at the
time the statue was unveiled. President
Coolidge declared, "America was born in
a revival of Religion. Back of that revival
were John Wesley, George Whitefield, and
Francis Asbury." Certainly that remark,
made with ample historical justice, carries
more than hint that there is such a thing
as a "Wesleyan heritage" which the eight
eenth century has passed on to us of the
twentieth century.
Or, take Sangster's statement, made near
the opening of his recent volume on The
Path to Perfection: "Most students who
have taken in hand a study of modern
'holiness movements' have traced their ori
gin to Wesley's teaching." One would un
derstand Sangster to mean their proximate
rather than their final origin. I suspect
that these movements would insist that
ultimately they trace their origin back to
the Holy Scriptures, even as Wesley him
self so emphatically claimed. But Sang
ster's comment is significant as pointing
to the fact that the evangelical awakening
of the 18th century, with Wesley as its
spearhead and symbol, marked an epoch of
far-reaching consequence in the history of
the Christian Church and in the doctrinal
development of Christian sanctity. It is,
in fact, this particular aspect of the Wes
leyan legacy that now concerns us.
John Wesley, to be sure, was not the
only instrument that God used in the
fashioning of our heritage. Besides the men
who had gone before him, such as Clement
of Alexandria, Macarius of Egypt, St.
Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Thomas a
Kempis, Tauler, and William Law�men
to whom he stood more or less deeply in
debt for their creative influence upon him
�there were his associates who helped to
give both range and color to the whole
evangelical revival. Outstanding among
these were John Fletcher, Adam Clarke,
Richard Watson, Charles Wesley, Thomas
Coke, and George Whitefield. Yet today,
viewing the "awakening" through the per
spective of 200 years, it is John Wesley's
name upon which the church historian fixes
as the guiding star of that amazing epoch.
Indeed T. R. Glover, the distinguished
ecclesiastial historian of Cambridge Uni
versity, himself a Baptist, ranks Wesley
with Paul, Augustine, and Luther as the
four most important figures of the entire
evangelical succession.
We are therefore justifed, I take it, in
using the adjective "Wesleyan" to describe
this immense spiritual, theological, social,
and ecclesiastial heritage which has come
down to us from the 18th century. It is
a vaster legacy than is dreamed by many
of our contemporaries, even those who re
gard themselves as informed. I want to
touch on some of these little-appreciated
consequences of the 18th century revival
when we come to the concluding address.
In this initial discussion I am venturing
to set as our task a brief survey of the
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doctrinal ground on which our Wesleyan
heritage rests, with the particular intention
of locating the points in the teaching and
testimony of Christian Perfection that have
been most open to debate. They might be
called the points of strain in our theology.
They are the areas in which our message
has seemed, let us say, least convincing
to those outside of the movement and
where, at the same time, there are some
obscurities and ambiguities even among
those who stand within the tradition of
Christian holiness.
As to what the Wesleyan position is,
which comes under the scrutiny of friend
and foe alike, it might, 1 suppose, be set
out in the following simple, non-technical
propositions :
1. Every Christian should aim at perfec
tion.
2. That which is realizable in this life
is the perfection of love.
3. Such love is ethical, that is, it involves
the keeping of the moral law.
4. The perfection which consists of this
love has freedom from sin as its impli
cate, sin being defined as a "voluntary
transgression of a known law."
5. The experience of this Christian Per
fection comes as a gift from God re
ceivable instantaneously by faith.
6. To this experience God, by His Spir
it, bears a witness of assurance, in
which we may be as confident as we
are of our justification.
These are the tenets�the things that
may be said to characterize "Wesleyanism"
whether in the "Methodism" of 18th cen
tury England or let us say the "Nazarene-
ism" of 20th century America. We now
ask, What criticisms, weaknesses or objec
tions have been urged against any or all
of these propositions, and what validity
do the criticisms have?
I
There is, to begin with, the objection
that, while aiming at perfection is proper
enough, all claims to attainment or realiza
tion are unscriptural, presumptuous and,
as many would add, fanatical.
Practically the whole weight of Reforma
tion theology, whether that of Luther or
Calvin, is back of this criticism. You see
it in Calvin's assertion that "sin always
exists in the saints till they are divested
of their mortal bodies." You see it in Lu
ther's dictum that "the saints are always in
trinsically sinners; that is why they are
declared righteous extrinsically." You see
it in the Barthian theology of today, as
represented, for example, by Emil Brunner
when he defines grace as the "justification
of the sinner, who though justified, con
tinues to the last days of his earthly life
to be a sinner and is as much in need of
forgiveness as on the day of his conver
sion." And you see it in the teaching of
Reinhold Niebuhr who, in his Gifford
Lectures under title of The Nature and
Destiny of Man, insists that man is con
stitutionally and inevitably a sinner. After
approving Schleiermacher's position that
"to be tempted means in a sense to have
sinned," he declares that temptation is a
state of anxiety from which sin flows
inevitably." If I have understood him
correctly, Niebuhr would not say that it
is a sin to be finite but he would say that
we cannot be finite without being sinners.
Now to what extent are these objections
valid? If they have any validity at all, it
is limited, I should say, to the reminder
they afford us that always we hold the
treasure of grace in an earthen vessel and
that, measured by a standard of absolute
perfection, we are, even when redeemed by
Christ, creatures of imperfection.
As for the weakness of the objections,
two things may be urged against them.
For one thing, they do not do justice to
the strength and frequency of those pas
sages in the New Testament in which sin
is dealt with as conquerable through the
grace of God and in which the life of the
Christian is described as one in which sin
is put away. It is a discerning and signifi
cant conclusion that is reached by Harnack
in his History of Dogma, when, summing
up the rise of Lutheranism, he says,
"Through having the resolute wish to go
back to religion and to it alone, [the
Lutheran Church] neglected far too much
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the moral problem, the Be ye holy, for I
am holy."
The other reply that may be made to
the objections with which we are now
dealing is this: They imply too large an
emphasis on Christ for us and too mild an
emphasis on Christ in us. Christ for us
means pardon�pardon endlessly repeated,
according to the view of the objectors, in
order to cover the sins that are endlessly
practiced. It would be unfair to say that
Martin Luther, for example, had no vision
of the power of Christ in us; but it would
be quite within the facts, I am persuaded,
if we were to say that his appreciation of
this aspect of evangelical Christianity was
not by any means as clear or full as it
might have been. And this weakness pre
vails in lesser or greater degree in all
theological systems in which there is des
pair of ever breaking the vicious circle of
sin in the present life.
Is it a mere accident, or is there a pro
found Christian logic involved, when Paul,
writing the last chapter of his Second Cor
inthian letter, raises the question, "Know
ye not that Jesus Christ is in you?" and
then goes on to say, quite flatly and confi
dently, "Do no evil ... do that which is
honest ... be perfect ... be of good
comfort, be of one mind, live in peace?"
Grace as pardon is our only hope with
respect to an accusing past, but grace as
power becomes our hope for a present and
a future in which we may "serve God
without fear in righteousness and holiness
before him all the days of our life."
II
We come now to a second point at which
the Wesleyan teaching is said to be weak
and in need of further clarification. Ac
cording to this criticism it makes an "inade
quate analysis of the nature of sin." Both
Flew and Sangster, among contemporary
writers, make this charge, and both of them
are, on the whole, sympathetic with the
idea of Christian Perfection.
Both scholars are of the opinion that
Wesley tends, for example, to look upon
man's depravity as a thing, a quantum, an
entity in itself, which can be removed Uke
a cancer or a bad tooth. I suppose one
might cite Wesley's statement, "There must
be a last moment wherein it (sin) does
exist and a first moment wherein it does
not."
In fairness to Wesley it should be
pointed out that he is no more guilty of
speaking of sin as though it were an entity
than is the Apostle Paul. Witness Paul's
words in Romans 7: "It is no more I that
do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." What
is important is Jiow we are to interpret such
language as this.
Flew is unquestionably right when he
remarks that "sin is not a mere thing."
Since it is a moral fact or phenomenon, our
effort to conceptualize it leads us to em
ploy metaphors. Sometimes the metaphors
are obvious and sometimes they are implied.
All of our thinking about spiritual realities
shows more or less of this characteristic.
So long as we realize that we are speaking
in similes or metaphors, well and good. On
the other hand, if we forget about it, con
fusion is bound to result and many a mis
guided argument is likely to arise.
Actually, of course, we cannot abstract
sin from the personal agent, the man, who
sins; nor can we abstract the quality of
sinfulness from the living individual who
is tainted. It is the individual himself
who must be subjected to a change in
which the acts of sins are no longer com
mitted and of whom the corruption and
disintegration of sin need no longer be
affirmed.
We might well pause here to make an
observation about the general relationship
of theology to life and the more particular
relationship of the theology of Christian
holiness to the subtleties, the vitalities and
the practicalities of life. All of our efforts
to reduce life to rationally systematic form
are in danger of sacrificing reality to logic.
Theology tends to be static; life is always
dynamic. Theology goes off in a corner
and reduces religious phenomena to a set
of neat, scrupulously defined propositions.
We then go out and try to superimpose
that system on life as we actually live it,
and we find that inevitably there are com-
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plications. By and large, I think it is a
fair criticism of our traditional presentation
of the doctrine of holiness to say that we
have been too wooden in our approach.
That is to say, we have tended to over
play our hand in the use of illustrations
and metaphors and create impressions of
simplicity that are not true to life. We have
resorted to the device of telling people that
conversion is like cutting down the tree
and entire sanctification Hke pulling out
the stump and its roots. A much better
illustration�one that is free from most if
not all of the misleading implications of
the tree-stump removal�is one in which
we liken sin to a fever from which the
body is suffering. The fever is not normal.
An infection is indicated. The fever can
be cured and the temperature returned to
normal. On the other hand, there may be
a recurrence of the fever if there is not
a required observance of the conditions
that make for the maintenance of health.
Ill
We come now to a third point of stress
where the Wesleyan thesis of Christian
Perfection has been challenged. I refer
to the teaching with regard to assurance
and testimony. Take this from one friendly
critic: "A man may bear testimony to his
awareness of a God who is willing and able
to 'destroy the last remains of sins.' He
cannot know himself well enough to claim
that God has already done it." Or this
from Sangster: "Other men may feel sure
that a saint is in their midst. But he him
self will not say, 'I am freed from all
sin.' Rather will he say with Paul, 'I judge
not mine own self ... He that judgeth
me is the Lord.' "
Incidentally, Sangster gives us every
reason to infer that he believes John Fletch
er spoke the truth when, according to
Hester Ann Rogers, he testified, "I am
freed from sin." Sangster's objection is
not to the possibility or the actuality of
such a thing, but only to the public pro
fession of it in that form.
Those of us who have been born and
reared in the Wesleyan tradition are proba
bly predisposed to accept rather uncritically
the tremendous claim that one makes when
he testifies that he is indeed delivered
from all sin. Do we realize how solemn
and immense a claim it really is? Do we
realize what is implied in our declaration
that we are sure it is so?
Professor Flew is positive that we do
not adequately cover the point by saying
that it is no more daring to testify to free
dom from all sin than it is to testify to
conversion and the forgiveness of sins. He
insists that when I say, "I know God has
forgiven my sins," it is primarily a con
viction that I have about God. But when
I say, "I know I am freed from all sin,"
it is primarily a conviction about myself.
And of course the question immediately
follows, Can I be trusted to know myself
well enough to make the categorical claim
that all sin is gone?
If I say, "At least I feel no sin," the
insistent critic may reply, "But do you dare
trust the emotion of a moment regarding
so immense a claim as this?" In this con
nection it might be pointed out that Wesley
himself seems at times to lack consistency
in his statements. Writing to one Mrs.
Maitland, on some of the perplexities of
Christian Perfection, he says, "Whether sin
is suspended or extinguished, I will not say.
It is enough that they [professors of per
fect love] feel no sin." On the other hand,
to Thomas Olivers he wrote, "Barely to
feel no sin, or to feel constant peace, joy
and love, will not prove the point." Here
he was insisting on the importance of the
sanctified ivill as being more determinant
than good feelings.
Furthermore, to the person who simply
says, "I feel no sin, therefore no sin re
mains," it may be replied, "Yes, you feel
no sin, but perhaps that is because you
have a conscience that is lacking in sensi
tivity to sin."
Speaking for myself, I am honor-bound
to say that I feel in some measure the
force of this criticism. And our problem
is not made easier by all the findings of
contemporary psychology regarding the de
ceptions, the evasions, the rationalizations
with which we mask our selfishness. As
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someone has very shrewdly said, "The
prayer of the publican may be no better
than the prayer of the Pharisee, if it be
written carefuly in a Journal and published
by his literary executor." Or, he might
have added, recited at regular intervals as
a crowd-catching "Life Story." It is possi
ble, in other words, to put a crude mani
festation of the ego out the front door
only to have it reappear as a religiously
robed ego at the back door.
Nor are we helped with this problem by
the fact that in the Wesleyan tradition we
emphasize the distinction between "carnali
ty" and "humanity", between sin and in
firmity, while at the same time the line
between the two is admittedly so fine that
we have never been able to draw it precise
ly or clarify it to the satisfaction of our
selves, least of all our critics. This was
vividly impressed upon me recently in a
meeting of Free Methodist ministers in the
East. More than a hundred preachers were
present when this topic came up. It was
revealing�and a bit disconcerting�to fol
low the discussion and see what differences
of opinion were to be found among those
excellent men.
Mr. Wesley probably felt the pressure
of these and other considerations and,
knowing how prominent was his position
in the evangelical movement, was exceed
ingly cautious about his personal witness to
the realization of Christian perfection. In
my own mind there is no doubt that he
believed he was a recipient of this grace.
It must be admitted, however, that he was
extremely reticent about announcing it in
the form of a personal testimony.
What is the upshot of this survey of
our position regarding assurance and testi
mony? Shall we concede that there is no
place for personal testimony to the grace
of perfect love with its correlate of ex
pelled sin?
No, there is no call for us to concede so
much. We must, however, allow for the
possibility of self-deception or presump
tion. We must watch against spiritual
pride, even as Wesley and Fletcher so
fervently urged. What else?
I think we can afford to take the em
phasis from our sinlessness and put it on
Christ's fulness within us. If one testifies,
"I am entirely sanctified," he at least com
mits the impropriety of making the ego the
springboard of his announcement. It is
manifestly better to say, "Christ is now,
by faith, my Sanctifier and my confidence
is that His blood cleanses my heart from
all sin." With one of Professor Flew's
conclusions it is difficult to disagree�un
less, of course, we are committed to some
species of "eternal security" for the sanc
tified. "Since holiness," says Flew, "is
given in response to faith, and since faith
is no mere single response but a continuous
succession of responses to the divine Giver,
it follows that the ideal life is a 'moment-
by-moment' holiness."
